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UNDERSTANDING ON LAOS

1. On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos and the Agreement on restoring peace and achieving national concord in Laos signed on February 21, 1973, the D.R.V.N. and the U.S.A. reaffirm their strong desire that the current negotiations between the two Lao parties will promptly come to a success.

2. The D.R.V.N. and the U.S. have been informed by the Lao parties that:

(a) The formation of the Provisional National Union Government would be achieved by July 1, 1973 at the latest.

The U.S. and DRV will exert their best efforts in that direction.

(b) After the formation of the Provisional National Union Government, the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign military personnel, regular and irregular troops and the dissolution of all military and paramilitary organizations, including the "special forces" organized, equipped, trained and commanded by foreign powers, will be completed within a period of no more than 60 days.

(c) After the return of all persons captured and detained because of their collaboration with the other side in wartime, each Lao party has the obligation of getting and supplying information to the other party about the missing in action, irrespective of their nationality.

May 25, 1973

DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the United States will cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance:

(a) The United States will resume mine-clearance operations within five days from today and will successfully complete those operations within [twenty-five] [thirty] days thereafter.

(b) The United States will supply to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers.

(c) The United States will announce when the mine clearance in each main channel is completed and will issue a final announcement when all the operations are completed.

3. In implementation of Article 2 and 3 of the Agreement and Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Protocol on the Ceasefire in South Viet-Nam:

(a) At _____ hours, G. M. T., _____, 1973 [time of signature of this communique] the High Commands of the two South Vietnamese parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command, to strictly observe

the ceasefire throughout South Viet-Nam twenty-four hours later and scrupulously implement the Agreement and its protocols.

(b) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall immediately carry out its task pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas controlled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties. This task shall be completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall also immediately carry out its task to agree on the corridors, routes, and other regulations on the movement of means of military transport of one party through areas of control of the other party. The Commission shall also immediately discuss the movements necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they occupied at the time the ceasefire entered into force on January 28, 1973.

(c) Twenty-four hours after the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3(a) enters into force, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions of Article 4 of the Ceasefire Protocol.

4. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel, into South Viet-Nam.

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam. However, the two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material, as authorized

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by Article 7, through designated points of entry and subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

In conformity with Article 15 of the Agreement, military equipment may transit the demilitarized zone only if introduced into South Vietnam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement and through a designated point of entry.

(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force of the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3(a) the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the modalities for the supervision of the replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three points of entry already agreed upon for each party. Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3(a), the two South Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement three additional points of entry for each party in the territory controlled by that party.

5. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement:

(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and in any event within no more than thirty days from today.

(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Protocol regarding the return of captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel

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shall be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possible. The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from today.

(c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured and detained personnel covered by that Protocol shall be treated humanely at all times. The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement Article 9 of the Protocol and, within fifteen days, allow National Red Cross Societies they have agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel are held.

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in obtaining information about missing persons and in determining the location of and in taking care of the graves of the dead.

(e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agreement, the parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

6. The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

"Immediately after the ceasefire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

"... achieve national reconciliation and concord, and hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

"... ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise."

7. Consistent with the principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agreement:

(a) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord consisting of three equal segments shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement.

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible and shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from today.

(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible."

8. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agreement:

(a) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall immediately be accorded the eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh and Saigon and Hanoi as required for the operations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the Four-Party Joint Military Team.

(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and the teams of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, except for teams at the points of entry, shall be located at places agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The accommodations of the military delegations of each party shall be located in the area under its control. The locations of these headquarters and teams shall be determined by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission within fifteen days after the entry into force of the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3(a).

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(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in paragraph 8(a) are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be fully staffed and its regional commissions and teams fully deployed within fifteen days after their locations have been determined.

(d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

9. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement and Article 10 of the Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, the International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned. The two South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary instructions to their personnel and take all other necessary measures to ensure the safety of such movement.

10. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented.

11. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement, the United States-Democratic Republic of Vietnam Joint Economic Commission shall

resume its meetings four days from today and shall complete the first phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter.

U.S. APPROACH TO MBFR

The U.S. approach to MBFR is based on a concern for maintaining a credible defense posture that would protect Allied security interests. Thus, the outcome of MBFR must maintain or enhance Alliance military security. This requires rectifying the Pact's present advantages in size, offensive orientation, and reinforcement capabilities through measures which will provide approximate parity and shift the composition of Pact forces to a more defensive-oriented force posture.

Our approach also must take into account: pressures within the Alliance for unilateral reductions; the effort to advance Allied interests in negotiations with the East; the improvement already achieved in East-West relations; and finally that the rough balance in strategic forces places a premium on a credible conventional defense.

In this context the U.S. approach to MBFR is:

- To achieve a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces.

- To maintain and improve Alliance military capabilities throughout the process, and to undertake reductions only in the context of negotiated agreements with the East.

- To obtain Alliance agreement on what constitutes the essential military requirements of any outcome for MBFR.

- To put forward a concrete proposal that forces the Eastern side to address the issues that concern us and demonstrates we are in earnest.

We recognize that MBFR must be pursued carefully and patiently and that it could well be a long and difficult process.

A key issue is the scope of MBFR: what countries' forces should be involved, how large reductions should be considered, and what should be the geographic extent of any measures. We believe that;

-- Alliance reductions should not exceed ten percent in either stationed or indigenous forces.

-- Stationed forces should be the focus of negotiations, not indigenous forces.

-- MBFR should be confined to Central Europe, that is, the two Germanies, the Benelux countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia with appropriate arrangements to ensure that Soviet forces in Hungary do not circumvent any agreement.

With these considerations in mind, three alternative outcomes have been developed which are acceptable to the U.S.

1. Phased common ceiling reductions of stationed and then indigenous forces based on a ten-percent NATO cut. In the first phase the U.S., U.K., Canada and Benelux would withdraw a total of 34,000 ground forces while the Soviets withdraw 83,000 ground personnel. In the second phase the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands would reduce 46,000 ground troops while the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia reduced 29,000.

2. Parity in NATO/Pact ground force levels through a one-sixth reduction in U.S. and Soviet ground forces. This would be about a ten percent reduction in stationed forces on the Allied side and a four percent reduction in overall NATO manpower. It would amount to a U.S. cut of 32,000 and a 65,000 Soviet reduction. The implementation reductions would be in two phases to permit assessment of results in the first phase.

3. A mixed-package 20-percent reduction of offensive force elements. This approach illustrates how we might gain a greater degree of stability in the European balance by reducing forces which either side may consider threatening. On our part this is the size and offensive orientation of Soviet armored forces.

On the Pact side, one tank army would be withdrawn from East Germany (60,000 troops, 1,500 tanks). On the Allied side, there would be a reduction of 1,000 nuclear warheads, 36 U.S. Pershing missile launchers and three air squadrons containing a total of 54 U.S. F-4 fighter-bombers along with associated personnel. The result would be rough parity in stationed ground forces.

In the pursuing any of these outcomes, we would also seek constraints on military activities before reductions. These could include pre-announcement of major exercises and movement of stationed forces into the area as well as limits on the size, location, number and duration of major exercises. To meet the need for flexibility, agreement on such constraints cannot be a precondition to negotiation of stationed force reductions. However, constraints should accompany such reductions and would be a pre-requisite to a negotiation of indigenous force reductions.

As for verification, the U.S. believes that our MBFR position must be designed as to be verifiable by national means (and including a commitment not to interfere with such means). In addition, we would be prepared to consider the possibility of proposing negotiated inspection measures; for example, observation of withdrawals and special inspection arrangements in the post-MBFR period.

We are now consulting with our Allies seeking their reaction to these outcomes and developing guidelines to be approved by Ministers for a preparation of a concrete negotiating position, including reductions, by the time negotiations begin on MBFR in the fall.

Marquis Childs

Post 26 May 1973

Talking With Chou En-lai

PEKING—When warships of the Soviet fleet sailed past China's front door through the Taiwan Strait it stirred a wave of speculation throughout Asia. The response from the United States command headquarters in Hawaii was a statement that American ships were still patrolling the waters between the Chinese mainland and the island of Taiwan that is Chiang Kai-shek's redoubt.

For the man who bears such a heavy responsibility for the management of both foreign and domestic policy in the People's Republic this was one more proof of what he has long believed. Premier Chou En-lai, in a discussion with this reporter lasting more than three hours, explained his conviction that the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union has been transferred from the Middle East to South Asia.

His conviction is grounded in an unshakable distrust of Soviet motives. Chou believes the intent of the Kremlin hierarchy, led by Leonid Brezhnev, is to lull the West into a false sense of security while the Soviets pursue their goal of hegemony everywhere.


Americans who argue for a reduction or even the entire elimination of American forces stationed in Germany are, in Chou's view, naive. How, he asks, can there be any assurance that if western troops are pulled back, the large Soviet concentrations in the five satellite powers will be reduced?

Chou is profoundly skeptical of the agreements signed in Moscow by Nixon and Brezhnev a year ago. Despite those agreements, he says, gesturing with his expressive hands, the nuclear arms race goes on up and up at a terrible cost. And there can be no reason to believe that it will not end in a nuclear war.

As for China's policy, the premier is confident that a Soviet strike across the northern border, so long a major threat, has been deterred. The deterrence has been achieved by successful diplomacy on the one hand and by extensive and costly measures of preparedness—a strong army, rapid nuclear missile development, tunnel digging—on the other hand.

The agreements signed with the United States and Japan, underwritten by the personal missions to Peking of President Nixon and Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, have removed the threat of a two- or even a three-front war.

The nightmare of such a war, however fantastic and improbable it may seem to the outsider, is what Chou and others at the top of the new China have lived with for many years. Through the '30s and into the 40s Japan waged a savage war of conquest. Chiang Kai-shek conserved his forces for the civil war that followed. Then in the 50s, after the Chinese had successfully repulsed American troops in Korea at the Yalu River, came the Dulles policy of trying to bring China down by isolating her and cutting off any exchange with the outside world. No



Premier Chou En-lai: "Confident that a Soviet strike across the northern border has been deterred."

wonder, then, that Chou and his colleagues have lived so long with the nightmare of fear.

On the diplomatic level India has several times approached Peking with a desire to talk. But Chou says that negotiation will not be possible until 90,000 Pakistani prisoners still held by India out of the war of late 1971 are repatriated. "A border issue must be settled, with India holding a large chunk of Chinese territory south of the McMahon Line.

The key to peace, however, is Indochina and the premier confesses he is baffled by American policy in Cambodia. The American bombing he sees as a futile attempt to hold a small place that was once a green oasis.

Why, he asks, should the United States support Lon Nol in Phnom Penh who is no old friend of the United States? If Prince Sihanouk, who has the complete backing of the People's Republic, could be returned,

he maintains, Cambodia would be an independent and neutral state. In this way the peace settlement in Indochina, which Chou sees as a gratifying development, could be further implemented.

As the premier looks at American policy in Asia, the error has been in trying to hold small places and thereby sacrificing the large. The American involvement in Cambodia is, after all, only three years old, dating from the Nixon incursion. Why should the conflict there not be settled peacefully?

An earthy peasant figure of speech says a lot about the American error: do not sacrifice the melon for the sesame seed.

Since the Nixon mission the premier understands the United States, and in his relationship with Henry Kissinger there is friendship. Yet, the tragedy of Cambodia and the threat to peace of the continued bombing cannot be ignored.

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Thursday, May 24, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

Anti-China Atomic Pact Seen Asked by Soviets

By Murray Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union in 1970 secretly proposed to the United States a plan for "joint retaliatory action" against China if it launched a nuclear attack against either one of them, according to a book just published.

This proposal, described as "a stunning glimpse of Moscow's China phobia," is related in a revealing detailed account of negotiations in the American-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) by author John Newhouse. His book, "Cold Dawn, The Story of SALT," is being currently serialized in The New Yorker magazine.

The United States' response to the Soviet proposal, Newhouse reported, was a "flat negative." But as a byproduct of these discussions, he said, the United States and the Soviet Union were stimulated into their agreement to reduce the risk that an "accidental or unexplained" nuclear firing by anyone could be misinterpreted as the opening of a nu-

clear war between the two super-powers.

Newhouse, a former staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, obtained access to many secret exchanges between the Nixon administration and the Soviet Union in preparing his book. His account, at numerous points, cites "back channel" communications between President Nixon and Soviet party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev, and between presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington.

The Soviet proposal concerning other nuclear powers, Newhouse wrote, was first raised by chief Soviet negotiator Vladimir S. Semenov in early stages of SALT negotiations in Helsinki, with the U.S. delegation headed by Gerard C. Smith.

The Newhouse account states:

"In Helsinki, Semenov had called attention to 'provocative attacks by third nuclear powers,' a subject the Americans managed to finesse.

"But on July 7 (1970), at a concert in Vienna, Semenov reopened the issue by putting it squarely to Smith in the form of a proposal, which was formally presented three days later.

"A stunning glimpse of Moscow's China phobia was provided: on learning of plans for some 'provocative' action or attack, the two sides—the United States and the Soviet Union—would take joint steps to prevent it or, if too late, joint retaliatory action to punish the guilty party.

"The Soviets, in effect, were proposing no less than a superpower alliance against other nuclear powers. Al-

though clearly aimed at China, the proposal risked arousing NATO, whose membership includes two other nuclear powers, Britain and France. The Soviets never would explain exactly what might constitute provocative actions.

"Washington rejected the idea immediately and just as swiftly informed the other NATO governments, lest they hear of it through another channel and conclude that SALT really did foreshadow a great-power axis or condominium."

In a footnote, author Newhouse commented, "Perhaps one day we will know whether Henry Kissinger, during his secret visit to Peking in July, 1971, told Premier Chou En-lai about Moscow's remarkable anti-China initiative."

The writer said that "Washington's flat negative (to Moscow's proposal) had again deflected the issue of provocative attacks, but Semenov warned that more would be heard of it . . . Something, it seemed, would have to be done to silence the problem."

This problem, Newhouse wrote, was "harmlessly—indeed, usefully—satisfied by two related accords known as the Accidents and Hot Line Agreements." Both were signed in Washington on Sept. 30, 1971.

The first is called, "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War" between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is designed to prevent the two powers from stumbling into nuclear war and to reduce the risk that the action of a third power could provoke a nuclear war between them.

This accord requires each party to notify the other immediately if an accidental, unauthorized or unexplained nuclear incident, including the detection of unidentified objects by missile warning systems, could create the risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The reinforcing hot-line agreement established additional communication circuits between Moscow and Washington to assure reliable links for emergency and general usage.

Received
May 27, 1973

The Chinese side has seriously studied the last Soviet draft of the "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War" and in comparison with the draft as it now stands after the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Moscow discussions in May along with the U.S. comments. The Chinese side cannot but arrive at the same conclusion it reached on the previous proposals: The current draft agreement still aims at the establishment of U.S.-Soviet nuclear hegemony over the world, hence Brezhnev's statement that the United States and the Soviet Union should be partners. The Chinese side was already aware of this at the time of the Sino-U.S. talks last February.

Dr. Kissinger has made many comments and explanations in regard to the draft agreement, stating that the prevention of nuclear war is a desire and the renunciation of nuclear weapons a future goal and not an obligation, and that the development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries, but that if at any time it appears to the United States and the Soviet Union that there is in international relations the risk of either of them getting involved in a nuclear war, they will immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and take measures accordingly, and that every obligation undertaken by the two parties after consultations obviously applies to third countries. This remains to be domination of the world in all respects by the two nuclear hegemons.

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Dr. Kissinger explained that the U.S. side has to conclude this agreement for the following objectives: First, to gain time. Secondly, to force the Soviet Union into a posture of peace so that it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack. Thirdly, to give the United States legal basis to speak on behalf of countries with which it does not have arrangements and to protect them. However, the price to be paid for these objectives is much too high. Once the conclusion of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on the prevention of nuclear war this June is announced, the United States will inevitably turn to a position in favour of Gromyko's proposal on the "non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" at the Security Council and the 28th session of the U.N. General Assembly. The false sense of security will not be confined to Europe alone but will spread to the world and definitely make inroads into the United States. This will have a demoralizing effect on efforts to strengthen defence and resist foreign pressure. All will turn to economic war, which exactly meets Soviet needs and dovetails with Soviet strategic plans. There will also be some among the people of the world who will be hoodwinked.

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China has never feared isolation. And there is no lack of far-sighted people in western countries and the Third World who will also have some misgivings about this agreement. There are now in the draft the following two formulations: 1. It is stated in the preamble that this agreement is "in conformity with agreements to which either has subscribed"; 2. Article VI states that "nothing in this agreement shall affect or impair ... (c) the obligations undertaken by the United States ... toward... allies or other countries in treaties, agreements and other appropriate instruments." In the comments as well as his conversation with Brezhnev, Dr. Kissinger further said that agreements and appropriate documents included the Shanghai Communique, presidential letters and the President's annual report. We greatly treasure the principles jointly confirmed in the Shanghai Communique. Therefore, we will refute at an appropriate time those documents and positions that do not accord with these principles, and will state China's position.

Authority EO 12958
By R.T. NARA Date 7-5-87

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Huang Hua, People's Republic of
China Ambassador to the United Nations
Mr. Kuo
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, May 27, 1973
10:00 - 11:15 a.m.

PLACE: PRC Mission to the UN
New York City

Kissinger: I want to talk first about my talks in Paris last week, then bring you up to date on a few other matters. We are looking forward to receiving your Ambassador when he arrives Tuesday.

Huang: Ambassador Huang Chen arrives in New York on the 28th, and will leave for Washington at 10:30, and arrived in Washington on the 29th.

Kissinger: I will see him that day. We leave for Iceland on the 30th. I may not be able to set up a meeting with the President before we leave, but certainly afterward. But I count on seeing him on Tuesday.

Does that mean then you are out of the picture, Mr. Ambassador?

Huang: [Laughing] Almost!

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Authority EO 12958
 By R.T. NARA Date 7-5-87

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Kissinger: Then you must come to Washington.

Huang: On May 18th, Prime Minister Chou received Mr. Bruce, Chief of the Liaison Office, and he told Bruce that the two sides could maintain contacts between Huang Chen and Dr. Kissinger in Washington and Ambassador Bruce and Vice-Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in Peking, but the New York channel could be open if necessary. This could be our last meeting in New York.

Kissinger: I have always enjoyed meeting with you in New York.

Huang: I know it is inconvenient for you.

Kissinger: But it is always a pleasure.

We appreciate very much the reception Ambassador Bruce had in Peking. We cannot do as well for you yet in Washington. I will talk to your Ambassador when he gets there. Whatever we can do to facilitate our relations, we will do.

Huang: The Administration doesn't have any accommodations on hand.

Kissinger: No, we have to buy it. Have you ever been to Washington?

Huang: No.

Kissinger: We will have to give a dinner for you.

Huang: That will be very nice.

Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, I want to talk briefly about our meetings [in Paris] last week.

We went through the Agreement article by article, and came to a tentative agreement on Vietnam and on Laos. And we are prepared to sign a joint communique with them which calls for implementation of various parts of the Agreement. I will leave you a copy of this Communique and of the understanding on Laos as it now stands. [Dr. Kissinger handed over the document at the end of the meeting, Tab A.]

The difficult problem we now face is Cambodia. The North Vietnamese say they have no real influence because Sihanouk is in Peking and you are the only people who have influence. I frankly do not believe this is true. I

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believe you have some influence but not the sole influence.

Here is the problem as we see it. We cannot be put in the position where the issue is settled by purely military means, because it is difficult for us to observe other parts of the Agreement if some parts are being systematically violated.

We agree with the objective which your Prime Minister pointed out to Ambassador Bruce--to have a neutral, independent and free Cambodia. As I said to your Prime Minister in Peking, our basic objective in Cambodia does not seem to us incompatible with China's objective. And frankly we do not think our basic objective in Indochina is incompatible with China's objective. We would like as far as possible to give each nation a chance to develop itself and to prevent a bloc which could support the hegemonial objectives of outside powers.

We recognize it is an extremely complex problem in Cambodia. But here is our tentative thinking--and there is some importance, if it is at all possible, in having some understanding before we go over again--which will be June 5.

Huang: June 5th.

Kissinger: June 5th. We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia, and we are prepared to withdraw the very small advisory group we have there. And we are prepared to arrange for Lon Nol to leave for medical treatment in the United States. In return we would like a ceasefire--if necessary, say for ninety days--a negotiation between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group; and while this negotiation is going on in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking. And when this process is completed, in some months, we would not oppose the return of Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia. But it is a process that has to extend over some time, and it must not be conducted in a way that does not take into account our own necessities.

We have not presented it in so much detail to the North Vietnamese, but we have presented the basic idea.

Now if we cannot come to an understanding, we will have to find means of pressure, no matter what Congress does--not on you but on the other parties there.

Huang: What do you mean by the other parties?

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Authority: EO 12958By R.T. NARA Date 7-5-87TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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Kissinger: The parties to the Paris Agreement. I mean the North Vietnamese. And then certainly, even if we sign this communique it will not be implemented. Because we can certainly not give economic assistance to the North Vietnamese under those conditions. So we want to bring this to the attention of the Prime Minister, first to show him we have taken his considerations to Ambassador Bruce very seriously, and also to say to him that if we could reach some understanding or get some assistance prior to our next meeting, it could lead to permanent peace in Indochina.

Huang: Well you have gone ahead of me on the question of Cambodia--because I also have got something for you.

Kissinger: When I become a really experienced diplomat, I will know--because the Ambassador will speak first!

Huang: We must show respect for you because you are our honored guest! [looks at talking paper] In his talk with Ambassador Bruce on May 18th, the Prime Minister touched on the question of Cambodia and the Premier mentioned the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. It is imperative that the two sides respect the sovereignty of Cambodia.

Kissinger: The two sides, the North Vietnamese and...

Huang: The United States. On the Cambodian side, Prince Sihanouk as well as the resistance forces at home, are willing to conduct negotiations with the U.S. side. The Chinese side considers that the sooner the U.S. side stops its intervention in the affairs of Cambodia, the better. It will serve the overall interest. And Premier Chou En-lai also mentioned that Mr. Mansfield once asked for another visit to China, and he wondered whether he still has this desire.

Kissinger: He always has this desire, but he is not competent to talk for the United States Government with Sihanouk. But he still has this desire. I can let you know, or let your Ambassador know.

Huang: I just wanted to remind you of what the Prime Minister said to Ambassador Bruce.

Kissinger: We agree with the Prime Minister, the sovereignty of Cambodia must be respected. And we are prepared to stop all military action in the circumstances I described, and we are willing to listen to other ideas on this subject. And we are also willing to let the members of Ambassador Bruce's staff begin conversations with Prince Sihanouk as soon as a ceasefire is

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arranged in Cambodia. So we would be prepared to work within the spirit of what the Prime Minister has said.

Huang: I will convey what you have said about Cambodia to Peking.

Kissinger: Good.

[The meeting broke for snacks.]

When I saw your colleague in Washington, I promised a paper on how we look at the Mutual Force Reduction negotiations. This is our basic approach to the problem. [Dr. Kissinger hands over a paper, Tab B] We have not discussed this with the Soviet Union yet. We have given it to our allies. Senator Fulbright called me yesterday and he complained bitterly about your Prime Minister's views on NATO as expressed to Marquis Childs [see Post article, Tab C]. He claimed it was my influence! I told him the Prime Minister had been on the Long March and isn't influenced so easily. [laughter]

Huang: We have read the two articles by Marquis Childs.

Kissinger: They were very good. I think they came out very well.

Huang: He has basically reflected his conversations with Chou En-lai, but as to the historical part it is not too accurate. He is not very familiar with modern Chinese history, particularly revolutionary history in China. Maybe he doesn't have any reference material!

Kissinger: Certainly, and he is not as intelligent as Joe Alsop. He is a good transmission belt but not very analytical.

Huang: He hasn't dwelt on Europe and the other questions in the context of the world situation.

Kissinger: Yes.

Huang: I think maybe he has told what the Prime Minister told Mr. Bruce in greater detail than in the Washington Post.

Kissinger: Frankly, I tell you in Washington I use Marquis Childs to convey simple ideas and Joe Alsop to convey complicated ideas. But I think the total impact of his articles was very positive.

Huang: Yes.

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Kissinger: And the nuances of which you are aware the American public would not know anyway.

I wanted to say one word about Korea. We are going to make a specific proposal to you in answer to your question of how the suspension and ultimate dissolution of UNCURK can be achieved. And we have been talking to the South Koreans and we think we can make major progress.

We have also talked to the South Koreans about a general policy to pacify conditions on the Korean peninsula.

I wanted to let you know where our present thinking is. It is not yet a formal agreement between them and us, but we are moving in that direction.

We are prepared, under conditions where the PRC and Soviet Union recognize South Korea, to recognize North Korea. South Korea will withdraw its objections to membership in UN organizations for North Korea. If South Korea is admitted to the UN as a member, it will not object to the admittance of North Korea. And if there is any discussion at the UN of the Korean question, South Korea will not object to the participation of a North Korean delegation, together with a South Korean delegation. So we are using our influence to calm matters on the Korean peninsula. And we will give you further details as this policy develops. But this is being given to you on a very confidential basis.

Huang: We see you have no reply to the questions in our message last week.

Kissinger: No, we will give it to you next week. But I can give you our general policy. On troops, as I told your Prime Minister, we plan on a gradual withdrawal.

Huang: As far as I understand from what you say just now, is it fair to say the U. S will not object to the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations this year?

Kissinger: Yes.

Huang: It means you will not oppose the inclusion of this item on the agenda.

Kissinger: That is my understanding of the present discussion with South Korea. That is a change in our position. But we are hoping the Vice Foreign Minister will not shoot too many cannons. [laughter]

Huang: We will always consider this question from an overall interest.

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Kissinger: The only other point that may be of some interest to you is, there was an article in the Washington Post referring to a Soviet proposal to us in the summer of 1970 [Tab D] and that is essentially correct.

Huang: We have read it.

Kissinger: That is all I have.

I want to see if the Ambassador, as a former military man, has committed all his reserves. [Mrs. Shih pulls out a paper] I see he hasn't!

Huang: Prime Minister Chou En-lai has entrusted me to convey this message, that is, on the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. [Huang hands over Tab E which Dr. Kissinger reads.]

Kissinger: I don't understand the last sentence.

Huang: The last sentence: "At the appropriate time we will refute those arguments and will state China's position."

Kissinger: Yes, what does that mean?

Huang: It means China will state its position on the question of some kind of treaty on the prevention of nuclear war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: And say what?

Huang: Well, we will state it at the appropriate time. I think you are aware of China's basic position on this question.

Kissinger: Let me say, first, we will not change our basic position at the General Assembly and Security Council. Last year we abstained and we will continue to abstain.

Huang: So there are only two countries which oppose it.

Kuo: We two.

Huang: We and Albania.

Kissinger: Last year we abstained.

Huang: Yes.

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Kissinger: This is the position we will maintain.

Huang: But abstention does not mean opposition.

Kissinger: No, but we are not changing our position as the result of any discussions with the Soviet Union. [Dr. Kissinger reads the Chinese paper.] It is a very thoughtful paper.

I am certain that... We will consider this very seriously and will talk to your Ambassador in Washington about it. And I am sure you will consider that it is in neither of our interests to create the impression that China puts the Soviet Union and the United States on the same level. We will not participate in any policy to isolate the People's Republic.

Huang: Will that agreement be concluded during Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June?

Kissinger: We will have to make a final decision this week.

Huang: No matter whether you abstain on Gromyko's proposal in the UN, as the message states, once you sign the agreement this creates a false sense of security and this sense of security will spread to other parts of the world and lull the vigilance of more people.

Kissinger: It is a very strong point.

Huang: This agreement will have more impact than the Gromyko one. Having read the latest draft agreement, as a result of your consultations in Moscow, I feel it is a sort of lullaby. You are virtually telling people they can put up their pillows and sleep.

Kissinger: I have explained to you our thinking about it, which is not the same. Our thinking is, it will either force the Soviet Union to live up to this agreement, or if it does not it will give us a basis for opposing them more effectively.

Huang: My impression from our previous conversations with you was that the United States was not prepared to conclude this agreement this year. And you were prepared not to stop discussion but not to conclude it over a long period of time.

Kissinger: If you compare where we started... The problem arose because almost every condition we raised was accepted.

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Huang: That means you have very similar positions, close positions.

Kissinger: Not in reality. And not in objective. If we want to have an agreement with the Soviet Union we don't need a formal agreement. If we want to conduct an anti-Chinese policy with the Soviet Union, we have offers to do this. I agree with you about Soviet objectives. The question really concerns the tactics to meet them.

Huang: No matter what your objectives or objective desires, once the agreement is announced, its real effect will be that it will lull the vigilance of the world people, and secondly the Soviet Union will have the opportunity to conduct propaganda to isolate China. This is my personal observation.

Kissinger: I appreciate that. I will discuss this urgently with the President. But as I said in Peking in February prevention of the isolation of China is one of our principal objectives. I had a long talk with President Pompidou, in which I explained to him why the survival and strength of China is essential for the security of Europe. I will give a summary of that conversation to your Ambassador Tuesday. The French gave me a verbatim record. Can I do that in French? Or should I get it translated?

Huang: They have no French translation there.

Kissinger: All right, I will get it translated. Do we have any other matters?

[After further pleasantries and warm handshakes, Dr. Kissinger then departed.]

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